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A B S T R A C T
Objective: We investigated the South African tendering system for medicines to (a) evaluate its impact on prices
and market concentration over a 14-year period and (b) analyze the accuracy of government forecasts of drug
demand.
Methods: We calculated Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes to measure market concentration levels based on all
pharmaceutical tender contracts issued by the South African government between 2003 and 2016 (n=8701).
We estimated price indexes to track changes in medicine costs over this period. We compared prices set through
tenders in the public health care system to the corresponding prices in the private system. We also analyzed
government data on procurement in selected drug classes to assess the accuracy of demand forecasts.
Findings: Between 2003 and 2016, the prices of medicines in most tender categories in the public health care
system dropped by an average of around 40% or more. The prices of medicines procured for the public system
through tenders were almost always lower than those sold in the private system. Tenders generally remained
moderately to highly competitive over time (i.e., Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes < 2500), although the number
of different firms winning contracts decreased in many categories. There were large discrepancies between the
drug need estimates by the government and the quantities it went on to procure, with estimates off by more than
50% in most drug classes (9/16 observations).
Conclusion: Tendering may be an effective measure to lower drug costs. Because most tenders remained com-
petitive over time, price decreases may be durable. South African government officials should monitor the
availability and prices of medicines to ensure continued access to affordable medicines for patients, as it may be
undermined by the decreasing number of firms winning contracts over time. Given the large discrepancy be-
tween forecasts and procurements, the government would benefit from improving the accuracy of its demand
forecasts.
1. Introduction
Pharmaceutical tendering refers to the bulk purchase of medicines
by a central buyer at fixed prices over specific periods following a
confidential bidding process (Wouters et al., 2017). In this way, the
buyer exercises its monopsony power to purchase medicines on behalf
of a wider patient population (Barber et al., 2013; Bergman et al.,
2017). This is expected to reduce drug costs as a result of price com-
petition, achieve economies of scale and scope for the buyer, and cut
administrative inefficiencies that arise in fragmented distribution sys-
tems (Bulow and Roberts, 1989). Indeed, the World Health Organiza-
tion considers tendering to be a form of strategic purchasing of health
care inputs, i.e. “active, evidence-based engagement in defining the
service-mix and volume, and selecting the provider-mix in order to
maximize societal objectives” (World Health Organization, 2018).
The procurement of medicines through government tenders is in-
creasingly common in the face of budgetary pressures (Callender and
Matthews, 2000; Dylst et al., 2011; Lalitha, 2008; Matthews, 2005;
Nguyen et al., 2015; Panteli et al., 2016; Vogler et al., 2017; Wirtz et al.,
2017; Wouters and Kanavos, 2015, 2017; Wouters et al., 2017). Pro-
ponents of pharmaceutical tendering argue it stimulates competition
between generic drug firms and drives down drug prices to more ac-
curately reflect costs of production. The strategic purchasing of medi-
cines from pharmaceutical firms may promote universal health cov-
erage and help ensure timely access to affordable medicines for patients
(Honda et al., 2016; Kutzin, 2013).
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The short-term cost savings from tendering must be weighed against
potential long-term adverse effects on competition in generic drug
markets. Critics claim tendering will drive losing firms out of business
and lead to higher prices over time, as manufacturers exit the market
(Hollis and Grootendorst, 2012; Sheppard, 2009). Moreover, tendering
is contingent on accurate forecasts of drug demand, which are com-
plicated to produce. Critics also argue that it increases the risk of pro-
duct shortages, as the market is forced to rely on fewer firms for supply
than under free-market conditions. If a contracted firm is unable to
supply the required quantities of a medicine on time—due to a manu-
facturing failure, for instance—it may lead to supply disruptions. In-
deed, there have been documented cases of medicine shortages in
countries which use medicine tenders, including the Netherlands
(Kanavos et al., 2009) and New Zealand (PHARMAC, 2016), often
owing to problems with the manufacture or availability of ingredients.
The New Zealand authorities, however, have noted that “despite the
myth that sole supply contracts lead to stock supply issues, the reverse
is true. New Zealand experiences comparatively fewer supply issues
than most other countries due to [the government's] approach to
managing supply” (PHARMAC, 2016).
Prior studies have looked at the impact of tendering on the costs of
biosimilars (Curto et al., 2014), vaccines (Garattini et al., 2012),
medicines sold in retail pharmacies (Bergman et al., 2017; Danzon
et al., 2015; Kanavos et al., 2012; Kanavos et al., 2009; Petrou, 2016;
Petrou and Talias, 2014), and medicines sold in hospital pharmacies
(Baldi and Vannoni, 2015; Bartels, 2016; Kastanioti et al., 2013;
Raventós and Zolezzi, 2015; Vogler et al., 2013). These studies have
generally found that the introduction of pharmaceutical tenders was
associated with large price decreases for generic medicines. In the
Netherlands, the prices of some generic drugs in retail pharmacies
dropped by as much as 90% overnight when insurers first started is-
suing tenders, suggesting that tenders can scoop substantial one-off
savings from price competition (Kanavos et al., 2009). Another study
found that originator and generic drugs procured through tenders for
international non-governmental organizations in 37 low- and middle-
income countries were priced, on average, 42% and 34% lower re-
spectively than the same products sold in retail pharmacies in these
countries (Danzon et al., 2015). In China, where tendering at provincial
level was introduced in all regions by the end of 2010, the national
government reported that prices of essential medicines dropped by an
average of 17% between 2009 and 2011 (Barber et al., 2013).
The findings of previous studies cannot necessarily be generalized to
other countries, given differences between countries in regulation, pa-
tent-litigation procedures, and political economies of health care sys-
tems (Barber et al., 2013; Wouters et al., 2017). Most existing analyses
are from high-income countries, and the applicability of the results of
those studies to lower-income settings is unclear. Also, results cannot
necessarily be generalized across therapeutic areas or medicine forms
(e.g., tablets versus creams), and it is not clear whether subsequent
tenders would sustain price decreases—or if prices would rebound as
manufacturers drop out of the market. The duration of follow-up in
earlier analyses have been short: all studies have examined at most six
years of data, except one study that examined medicines sold in hospital
pharmacies over eight years (Bartels, 2016). Most studies have analyzed
less than five years of data (Amaral and Blatt, 2011; Baldi and Vannoni,
2015; Blankart and Stargardt, 2017; Danzon et al., 2015; Ewen et al.,
2014; Garattini et al., 2012; Gómez-Dantés et al., 2012; Kastanioti
et al., 2013; Lunte et al., 2015; Messori, 2016; Petrou and Talias, 2014;
Vogler et al., 2013). Data over longer periods and from more countries,
especially low- and middle-income ones, are needed to assess the im-
pact of pharmaceutical tendering on prices and market concentration.
In this study, we investigated the South African tendering system for
medicines, which has been in operation since 1982. The country's na-
tional government issues tenders for essential medicines and related
products sold in all pharmacies in the public health care system. The
government divides these items into 15 categories (Box 1) and issues
tenders for each category every two to three years. The government
accepts confidential bids from national and international manufacturers
and importers with the right to sell a given product in South Africa (i.e.,
a firm must have received marketing authorization from the national
medicines agency). To date, all international firms have operated in the
country through locally-registered subsidiaries, offices, or importers
(Gray et al., 2016). Demand estimates for each line item are largely
based on usage rates in previous years and epidemiological forecasts.
The estimated quantities are not binding, and the South African gov-
ernment may procure smaller or larger amounts of drugs than those
requested in the tender contracts.
In most cases, a two-stage scoring system is used to determine the
winner for each item. First, the firm offering the lowest price gets 90
points, and other firms receive deductions proportional to their distance
from the lowest bid, based on a published formula. Then, the remaining
10 points are allocated based on so-called broad-based black economic
Box 1
List of medicine tender categories in South Africa (2017).
1. Anti-tuberculosis medicines
2. Anti-infective medicines (ie, antibiotic, anti-fungal, antiprotozoal, and anti-viral agents)
3. Family planning agents
4. Oncology and immunological agents
5. Diagnostic agents and contrast media
6. Small-volume parenterals and insulin devices
7. Drops, aerosols, inhalers, and inhalants
8. Semi-solid-dose medicines (incl. powders)
9. Solid-dose medicines and transdermal patches
10. Biological preparations
11. Large-volume parenterals
12. Pharmaceutical liquids, alcohols, ethers, glycerin, and methylated spirits
13. Anti-retroviral medicines
14. Pharmaceutical packaging materials
15. Intravenous administration accessories
Note: The groupings have changed since 2003. For instance, between 2003 and 2008, the second group only included antibiotics. In 2009,
the group was expanded to include other types of anti-infective medicines. The category for intravenous administration accessories was
introduced in 2015.
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empowerment scores. Each company is given an empowerment score by
the government according to preset criteria, such as the proportions of
equity owners and management teams that belong to racial groups
previously disadvantaged under apartheid.
The South African national government considers other factors on
an ad hoc basis when awarding tender contracts. For example, the
government may be willing to pay a premium corresponding to up to 10
points to national drug makers to promote local economic growth, in-
dustry diversification, job creation, and a positive trade balance
(National Planning Commission of South Africa, 2012); local sub-
sidiaries of foreign multinational firms are not eligible for preferential
treatment. To reduce the risk of supply disruptions, the national gov-
ernment sometimes splits contracts between multiple firms if bids are
close to each other in points. The national government may also split
awards, regardless of point differentials, if (a) the required volume is
high, meaning there is a greater risk of supply disruptions, (b) the
product is of high public health importance, such as first-line anti-ret-
roviral drugs used to treat human immunodeficiency virus, or (c) the
highest scoring bidder had a poor performance history in previous
years.
A full account of the evaluation criteria can be found in the “special
requirements and conditions of contract” sections of the agreements,
which are published online with each tender. Once the winning com-
panies have been announced, provincial health departments and other
institutions are responsible for ordering medicines directly from these
companies at the prices set in the contracts.
We have two objectives. First, we present evidence on the impact of
the South African tendering system on prices and market concentration
over a 14-year period. This is some of the first evidence on the long-
term effects of pharmaceutical tenders, and it allows us to analyze the
validity of the key criticisms of tendering. Second, we compare the drug
quantities the South African government estimated it would need to
meet patient demand during tender periods and the quantities the
government went on to procure. These findings provide insight into the
effectiveness of tendering in improving access to medicines in low- and
middle-income countries.
2. Methods
2.1. Data sources
We reviewed all tender contracts awarded by the national govern-
ment between 2003 and 2016 via the National Treasury and National
Department of Health websites; some contracts were retrieved in person
from National Department of Health archives (Pretoria, South Africa).
Tender contracts contain information on medicine prices, estimated
quantities, and winning manufacturers. We excluded data on diagnostic
agents, packaging materials, and intravenous administration acces-
sories (categories 5, 14, and 15 in Box 1), as these categories do not
include medicines. Each line item in a tender corresponds to a mole-
cular or biological entity in a certain strength, form, and pack size.
We identify individual tender contracts, which cover periods ran-
ging from two to three years, by their starting year. For example, the
2012 solid-dose tender refers to the tender for solid-dose drugs covering
the period from 1st August 2012 to 31st July 2014. Appendix A lists
tender contracts and their starting years, durations, and numbers of line
items.
Data on the prices of medicines in the private health care system
were obtained from the Private-Sector Database of Medicine Prices
(2009–2016), which is published on the National Department of Health
website and updated regularly; some of the historical data were ob-
tained in person from departmental archives. Data on the quantities the
government went on to procure in individual tenders were obtained
from the Republic of South Africa Pharmaceutical Database
(2011–2016). This database is generated from a web-based reporting
platform through which contracted suppliers give information on all
orders received and delivered to allow the national government to
monitor stock levels. The dataset is not publicly available and was
obtained in person from National Department of Health archives.
All data were analyzed in Stata 15 (StataCorp), with prices reported
in 2016 rand based on consumer price index adjustments to account for
inflation (Statistics South Africa, 2017). In all price analyses, we cal-
culated weighted prices for split awards. For instance, if one firm was
asked to supply 60% of the contracted volume at a price of 5 rand per
pack, and another was asked to supply 40% of the volume at a price of
10 rand per pack, the weighted price was 7 rand.
The manuscript does not contain data collected from human sub-
jects, so ethical approval was not required. As a precaution, we ob-
tained ethical approval from the research ethics committee at the
London School of Economics and Political Science (application no.
404–2015).
2.2. Analysis of market concentration
We calculated Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes to measure the degree
of market concentration in each medicine tender issued by the gov-
ernment since 2003. A Herfindahl-Hirschman index is a summary sta-
tistic of the amount of competition in a market: the index reflects the
number of firms in a market and their relative market shares. These
indexes are calculated by summing the squared market shares of every
manufacturer.
For a market with a given number of firms, the index score is
minimized if all firms have equal market shares. Index scores in-
crease—indicating greater market concentration—if (a) firms exit the
market or (b) the distribution of market shares between firms grows
uneven. The indexes are measured on a scale of 0–10,000, with a score
of close to 0 indicating perfect competition, and a score of 10,000 in-
dicating a monopoly. We adopted the US Department of Justice defi-
nition of market concentration: a score of 1499 or lower indicates a
competitive or unconcentrated market, a score of 1500 to 2499 in-
dicates a moderately concentrated market, and a score of 2500 or
higher indicates a highly concentrated market (U.S. Department of
Justice & Federal Trade Commission, 2010).
We considered tenders for each of the categories in Box 1 as distinct
pharmaceutical markets. These categories are defined by the national
government, and each tender is subject to individual “special require-
ments and conditions of contract”. Each tender thus represents an op-
portunity for a firm to decide whether or not to compete in a market.
We calculated the market share of each firm in a tender by dividing the
projected value of all products awarded to that firm by the projected
value of all products in the tender.
A parent drug company and its divisions and subsidiaries were
treated as one firm. For example, Adcock Ingram Critical Care is a di-
vision of the South African drug firm Adcock Ingram, while Sandoz is
the generic drug division of Novartis, a multinational pharmaceutical
company. Appendix B details mergers, acquisitions, and company name
changes that occurred between 2003 and 2016. The appendix also lists
the names of parent companies and their subsidiaries and gives addi-
tional information on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index calculations.
2.3. Analysis of price trends
To track how the prices of medicines in each tender category
evolved between 2003 and 2016, we calculated three types of weighted
price indexes: Laspeyres, Paasche, and Fisher indexes (Danzon and Kim,
1998; Wouters and Kanavos, 2017). The formulas are presented in
Appendix C.
In a weighted index, the prices of widely used drugs are given
greater weight in the calculations than those of less consumed drugs.
Each index relies on a different weighting strategy. The difference be-
tween Paasche and Laspeyres indexes has to do with the quantity
measures: the former applies quantity weights from the first period,
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while the latter applies weights from the most recent period. The choice
of index reflects assumptions about the relationship between prices and
consumption, which have been described elsewhere (Goodridge, 2007;
International Labour Office, 2004; Statistics South Africa, 2013). If the
weighted price and quantity changes are negatively correlated, the
Laspeyres index will be greater than the Paasche index. If these changes
are positively correlated, the inverse is true. Yet according to a pub-
lication from the U.K. Office for National Statistics, “the choice of
whether to use a Laspeyres or Paasche is fairly arbitrary. The decision
will probably make very little difference to the final index, unless there
has been a substantial change to the weighting of the variable”
(Goodridge, 2007).
However, because the prices and quantities of some medicines
could, in theory, differ substantially between the base and current
periods in our sample, we also calculated a Fisher index. This index is
the geometric average of the other two indexes, and it therefore lies
between them. It is generally preferred when the Laspeyres and Paasche
indexes may produce widely discrepant results (Goodridge, 2007).
Thus, we view the Fisher index as the primary result in this paper, and
we present Laspeyres and Paasche indexes as sensitivity analyses.
A price index shows the average percentage change in the prices of
products between two periods (International Labour Office, 2004).
They are interpreted as price ratios. In our case, the first tender in each
category is assigned an index value of 100, and indexes in subsequent
years are interpreted in relation to the base year. For example, a Fisher
score of 80 in a given year means that prices were, on average, 20%
lower than in the base year; Laspeyres and Paasche indexes are inter-
preted in the same way. There is one caveat: the results of Laspeyres
indexes in different years can be compared with each other, since the
denominator is constant, whereas the results of Fisher and Paasche
indexes in given years can only be compared with the base year
(Goodridge, 2007).
In our analysis of every tender since 2003, we kept the sample
constant over time by restricting the price-index analyses to medicines
in the same form, strength, and pack size. This was done to examine the
impact of tendering on the prices of individual products over a longer
period. We accepted minor changes in pack size (e.g., from 28 to 30
tablets), as documented in Appendix C. The resulting sample consisted
of 7 anti-tuberculosis medicines, 39 anti-infective medicines, 7 family
planning agents, 32 oncological products, 117 small-volume par-
enterals, 32 drops and inhalers, 34 semi-solid medicines, 116 solid-dose
medicines, 11 biological products, 12 large-volume parenterals, 20 li-
quids and spirits, and 8 anti-retroviral therapies. As a further sensitivity
analysis, we dropped the first two tender contracts in each category to
increase the sample size and recalculated all the indexes.
2.4. Analysis of government forecasts of drug demand
We compared the quantities the national government estimated it
would need between 2012 and 2016, as declared in the tender contracts
issued during this period, to the quantities the government went on to
procure over the course of each contract. We selected the tenders issued
during these years because of the availability of complete data for each
contracted period.
We focused on medicines in seven therapeutic classes: angiotensin-
converting enzyme inhibitors, angiotensin receptor blockers, atypical
antipsychotics, calcium channel blockers, proton-pump inhibitors, se-
lective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, and statins. These medicines,
which are some of the most widely consumed globally, have been se-
lected as tracer drugs in other studies of the impact of tendering on drug
prices (Kanavos et al., 2012, 2009). We also looked at procurement data
for first- and second-line therapies for human immunodeficiency virus
and tuberculosis, given the importance of these products to public
health in South Africa.
2.5. Analysis of public versus private-sector prices
For the medicines included in the analysis of government forecasts
of drug demand, we compared the prices set through tenders in the
public health care system to the corresponding prices in the private
system. If a product was sold by multiple firms in the private health
care system, then the lowest price was used for the comparison. We did
not examine the private-sector prices of anti-tuberculosis medicines
since these products are sold almost exclusively in public facilities.
3. Results
3.1. Summary statistics
Between 2003 and 2016, the South African government tendered for
2198 medicines. This totaled 7645 line items across the 14-year period,
ranging from 63 biologics to 3004 solid-dose medicines. Solid-dose and
anti-infective medicines, the two largest tender categories, accounted
for roughly half the products (51%, 3920/7645). Counting split awards,
the national government issued a total of 8701 contracts.
Table 1 shows the projected budget impact of tenders issued be-
tween 2003 and 2016, based on the prices and estimated quantities
listed in the contracts. The projected values of the tenders for solid-
dose, anti-retroviral, and anti-tuberculosis medicines rose by 65%
(4.73/2.87 billion), 124% (14.19/6.33), and 49% (0.94/0.63) respec-
tively between the first and last tenders, based on inflation-adjusted
costs. In most other categories, projected values remained similar over
Table 1
Estimated budget impact of each tender in billions of rand (2003–2016).
2003/04 2005/06 2007/08 2009/10 2011/12 2013/14 2015/16
Anti-tuberculosis medicines – – 0.63 0.17 0.60 1.05 0.98
Anti-infective medicines 2.08 2.45 1.16 2.53 1.23 1.64 2.07
Family planning agents 0.87 0.56 0.45 0.31 0.38 0.27 0.32
Oncological products 0.42 0.76 0.46 0.50 0.57 0.38 0.42
Small-volume parenterals – – 2.16 1.72 1.45 1.91 –
Drops and inhalers – 0.66 0.68 0.86 0.70 0.79 –
Semi-solid medicines 0.48 0.59 0.69 0.71 0.53 0.58 –
Solid-dose medicines 2.87 2.85 4.06 3.32 3.14 2.95 4.73
Biological products – – – – 0.69 0.93 0.84
Large-volume parenterals – – 0.92 – 0.56 0.96 –
Liquids and spirits – – 0.59 0.20 1.10 0.68 –
Anti-retroviral therapies 6.33 – 6.41 5.29 – 6.66 14.84
Total 13.05 7.87 18.21 15.61 10.95 18.80 24.20
Note: The first row shows the starting years of contracts. The period covered by each tender is listed in Appendix A. For example, the 2014 tender for semi-solid
medicines covered the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 April 2017, which is why there is no budget impact figure for 2015/16. All values are reported in 2016 rand
based on consumer price index adjustments.
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time or, in a few cases, decreased slightly.
Over time, the government has split a growing number of contracts.
From 2003 to 2010, the South African government split 195 contracts,
whereas it split 218 contracts between 2011 and 2016. Over the entire
14-year period, most split contracts were awarded in one of six cate-
gories: solid-dose (185 split contracts), anti-infective (94), small-vo-
lume-parenteral (29), oncological (25), family planning (21), and anti-
retroviral medicines (21).
3.2. Market concentration
Between 2003 and 2016, 167 different companies were awarded at
least one tender contract. About half the contracts (50%, 4345/8701)
were awarded to 10 companies: Aspen Pharmacare (965 contracts),
Adcock Ingram (761), Novartis (536), Pfizer (380), Fresenius (366),
Sanofi (319), Ranbaxy (307), Cipla Medpro (276), GlaxoSmithKline
(243), and Biotech Laboratories (192). Aspen Pharmacare, Adcock
Ingram, Cipla Medpro, and Biotech Laboratories are South African firms
that mostly supply generic products.
Fig. 1 shows the Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes for each category
since 2003. The results indicate that many markets remained highly or
moderately competitive, including those for solid-dose, semi-solid, on-
cological, and anti-infective medicines. For instance, the solid-dose
tender had a score of 886 in 2003, compared to 1187 in 2016, both of
which are smaller than the benchmark of 1499 or lower set by the US
Department of Justice to indicate a highly competitive market. The
market for anti-retroviral therapies grew more competitive between
2003 and 2015, over which time the index decreased from 2701 (highly
concentrated market) to 2054 (moderately concentrated market).
The markets for biologicals, drops and inhalers, large-volume par-
enterals, anti-tuberculosis medicines, and family planning agents were
highly concentrated in most years. The largest percentage increases
between the earliest and latest tenders occurred in the markets for semi-
solid medicines (785 in 2003 to 1848 in 2014) and family planning
agents (1439 in 2003 to 2676 in 2015). The market for family planning
agents was the only one to go from highly competitive to highly con-
centrated at any point during this period.
With the exception of anti-retroviral therapies, the number of
pharmaceutical products procured through tenders decreased in all
categories between 2003 and 2016 (Appendix A). The number of
manufacturers winning at least one contract has also decreased over
time in most categories (Appendix B). For example, the number of
winners in the solid-dose tender dropped from 49 to 32 between 2003
and 2016, while the number of winners in the oncological tender fell
from 25 to 13.
The full results of the market concentration analyses can be found in
Appendix B.
3.3. Price trends
Fig. 2 shows price trends by tender category. The results were lar-
gely consistent across the three types of price indexes, although trends
varied between medicine categories. The prices of anti-retroviral
therapies, oncological products, family-planning agents, small-volume
parenterals, and solid-dose medicines fell consistently over time. For
example, the Fisher results indicate that the prices of medicines in the
oncological tenders dropped by an average of 70% between 2003 and
2016, while the prices of anti-retroviral therapies fell by an average of
85% between 2004 and 2015.
The prices of anti-infective medicines and drops and inhalers de-
creased by approximately 40% between the first and last tenders,
though there were price increases for these products in some of the
intervening years. The prices of anti-tuberculosis and semi-solid medi-
cines dropped by around 15% over this period, whereas the prices of
Fig. 1. Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes for each tender (2003–2016).
Note: We excluded categories with three or fewer tenders (i.e., large-volume parenterals and biologicals); full results can be found in Appendix B.
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biological products, semi-solid medicines, and liquids and spirits re-
mained stable. The figure shows spikes in the prices of anti-infective
and solid-dose products in the most recent tenders. Appendix C includes
the raw figures for all the price indexes in the primary and sensitivity
analyses. The results of the sensitivity analysis in which the first two
contracts are omitted are comparable to those shown in Fig. 2.
3.4. Government forecasts of drug demand
Table 2 gives the total estimated and procured quantities for solid-
dose medicines in seven therapeutic classes, as well as for anti-retro-
viral and anti-tuberculosis medicines. Large discrepancies between the
two quantities are evident in most cases. In 2012, for example, the
South African government underestimated demand for proton-pump
inhibitors by over 55%, whereas it overestimated demand for this class
of drugs by more than 40% in the next tender.
In the 2012 tender, the South African government estimated it
would need 34,594,171 packs of the medicines in all seven therapeutic
classes, and 121,566,800 packs in the 2014 tender. Ultimately, the
government procured 16,640,339 packs (52% less than predicted) in
the 2012 tender, and 83,593,114 packs (31% less) in the 2014 tender.
The government overestimated demand for anti-retroviral and anti-tu-
berculosis medicines by 22% and 57% respectively in the corre-
sponding 2013 tenders. Yet aggregate estimates for solid-dose medi-
cines in each of the seven therapeutic classes improved in accuracy, in
absolute terms, between 2012 and 2014. Appendix D presents the full
results for every medicine included in the government forecast analysis
for which data were available.
Fig. 2. Price trends by medicine category (2003–2016).
Table 2
Estimated versus actual procurement figures for anti-retroviral, anti-tuberculosis, and solid-dose medicines in tenders issued between 2012 and 2014.
2012 2013 2014
Estimated
volume
Procured
volume
% change Estimated
volume
Procured volume % change Estimated
volume
Procured
volume
% change
Angiotensin receptor blockers 172,100 41,136 −76.1% – – – 355,000 437,229 23.2%
Angiotensin-converting
enzyme inhibitors
1,262,900 2,043,530 61.8% – – – 44,920,200 35,005,480 −22.1%
Anti-retroviral therapies – – – 130,871,700 101,796,577 −22.2% – – –
Anti-tuberculosis medicines – – – 16,821,770 7,295,537 −56.6% – – –
Atypical antipsychotics 1,319,900 329,702 −75.0% – – – 2,398,700 2,380,170 −0.8%
Calcium channel blockers 20,555,972 7,942,279 −61.4% – – – 31,182,400 26,681,543 −14.4%
Proton-pump inhibitors 2,978,299 4,617,333 55.0% – – – 7,055,100 4,053,951 −42.5%
Selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors
1,752,100 807,596 −53.9% – – – 2,302,400 2,418,752 5.1%
Statins 6,552,900 858,763 −86.9% – – – 33,353,000 12,615,989 −62.2%
Total 34,594,171 16,640,339 −51.9% 147,693,470 109,092,114 −26.1% 121,566,800 83,593,114 −31.2%
Note: The percentage change is the procured volume minus the estimated volume, expressed as a proportion of the estimated volume. The formula is
100Procured EstimatedEstimated .
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3.5. Public vs. private-sector prices
With the exception of atazanavir (150mg) in 2015, the prices of all
solid-dose and anti-retroviral medicines were higher in the private
health care system than in the public one. For example, a 30-tablet pack
of atorvastatin 20mg cost 511% more in the private system in 2009,
and 178% more in 2016, than in the public system. Other cholesterol-
lowering drugs cost between 127% (atorvastatin 40mg in 2014) and
996% (pravastatin 20mg in 2014) more in the private system than in
the public one. Appendix E gives the private- and public-sector prices of
every medicines included in our analysis for which data were available
in both sectors.
4. Discussion
Pharmaceutical tenders aim to improve the quality, efficiency,
equity, and responsiveness of pharmaceutical care. Yet critics argue
that centralized purchasing of medicines may cause firms to exit the
market and increase market concentration. This could, over time, drive
up the prices of medicines in therapeutic areas with decreasing com-
petition and increase the likelihood of supply disruptions, in part due to
misestimates of drug demand.
The results of this study suggest that tendering can achieve large
price decreases for medicines, and that such decreases can be sustained
over time. Between 2003 and 2016, we observed price drops in many
drug categories. The prices of medicines in the South African public
health care system remained considerably lower than those in the pri-
vate health care system, where no tendering system exists. These
findings are consistent with those of earlier, shorter studies that found
that the introduction of pharmaceutical tenders was associated with
decreases in the prices of medicines (Baldi and Vannoni, 2015; Bartels,
2016; Bergman et al., 2017; Curto et al., 2014; Danzon et al., 2015;
Garattini et al., 2012; Kanavos et al., 2012, 2009; Petrou and Talias,
2014; Raventós and Zolezzi, 2015), although some studies found no
relationship between tender volumes and prices (Danzon et al., 2015;
Garattini et al., 2012). Further work is needed to better understand the
mechanisms by which tendering systems achieve price reductions,
which may allow policymakers to improve the designs of these systems.
In this paper, we did not seek to explain differences in market
concentration trends in individual drug categories, which would re-
quire detailed market analyses. Instead, we note that the pharmaceu-
tical tendering system in South Africa seems to have maintained ade-
quate levels of competition in many of the tender categories, as
evidenced by our Herfindahl-Hirschman index results over a 14-year
period. Yet there remain regulatory barriers to market entry in South
Africa which may threaten competition in the pharmaceutical sector.
Notably, registering a medicine with the government agency in charge
of granting drug firms marketing authorization has historically been a
slow and laborious process for companies (Leng et al., 2015). Appli-
cations for new drugs can take up to three years (Leng et al., 2015),
while changes to existing registrations (e.g., to register a new source of
an active ingredient) can take two years to be approved (Chorley,
2014). There is little coordination of tender issuance and the registra-
tion of products, which leads to some items being excluded from ten-
ders, further weakening competition. For tendering systems to sustain
competition, it may be important to put in place policies that make it
easy for drug companies to take part in tenders.
Though most tenders remained moderately to highly competitive
during the study period, there were exceptions: the prices of some
products increased over time, and certain tender categories grew less
competitive, such as those for anti-tuberculosis and family planning
agents. The latter finding might be explained by the inability of firms
producing anti-tuberculosis and family planning agents to manufacture
other products at the same facilities, due to risk of cross-contamination.
Consequently, losing bidders for these products must often shut down
their facilities as a direct result of the loss, which adds financial risk and
may discourage current and prospective market participants from en-
gaging.
Our results further suggest that the South African government
would benefit from improved accuracy of its drug demand forecasts.
The estimated quantities in tender contracts sometimes far exceed the
amounts needed, whereas in other cases they fall well short of the re-
quired quantities. Discrepancies between estimated and procured
quantities were observed for a wide range of products, including
therapies used to treat tuberculosis and human immunodeficiency
virus, cholesterol-reducing and anti-hypertensive drugs, and anti-psy-
chotic medicines. Poor demand forecasts can make it difficult for sup-
pliers to plan production and delivery schedules, which may raise the
risk of supply disruptions.
Fiscal federalism in South Africa means that although tendering is
conducted centrally by the national government, the procurement of,
and payment for, medicines is done by provinces, with provincially held
budgets (Magadzire et al., 2017). Representatives from each provincial
health department are involved throughout the tender process, as are
stakeholders from policy and finance units in the national government.
Yet in the past decade, delays in the awarding of tenders by the national
government (Magadzire et al., 2017), late payments by provincial
bodies (Bateman, 2013; Steyn et al., 2009), failures of some suppliers to
meet contractual agreements (Gray, 2014; Magadzire et al., 2017), and
government corruption (Bateman, 2013) have contributed to supply
disruptions. Information systems are not standardized across provinces
(Steyn et al., 2009), resulting in usage and demand data which are poor
and patchy. Improved dialogue between different levels of government
and suppliers may help the government to ensure adequate stock levels
and improve supply chain policies in the public sector (Bateman, 2013;
Gray, 2014; Magadzire et al., 2017; Magadzire et al., 2015; Steyn et al.,
2009).
The adverse effects of supply disruptions are significant. In the event
of shortages, the South African government can procure medicines off-
contract from approved suppliers, but such orders usually come at steep
premiums. For patients, a reliable supply is critical to therapeutic effi-
cacy, as many infection management regimes rely on regular doses.
This point is particularly relevant to South Africa as a country with a
high infectious disease burden (Pasquet et al., 2010; Schowalter and
Conradie, 2012). More generally, stock-outs can harm patient trust in
the health care system (Goudge et al., 2009).
Tendering policies differ between countries, so the results of this
study cannot necessarily be applied to other settings. Studies from more
countries are needed to validate these findings. For example, the South
African government attaches considerable weight to broad-based black
economic empowerment scores for historical reasons: the dual aims of
redressing past injustices and promoting equitable development lie at
the heart of industrial policies in the country. The combination of en-
ormously unequal income distribution (Mooney and Gilson, 2009), low
education levels (Coovadia et al., 2009), and lack of access to essential
health care services (Mayosi and Benatar, 2014) results in a vicious
cycle of poverty and social exclusion for many, tracing back to the
structural inequalities inherited from the racially divided apartheid
state. By contrast, many other countries rely on pharmaceutical ten-
dering to try to extract the lowest possible prices from firms (Dylst
et al., 2011). Similarly, the frequency of tendering varies considerably
between European countries, and some countries do not split contracts
between multiple firms as done in South Africa (Dylst et al., 2011). And
while the national government is in charge of the tendering system in
South Africa, health insurance companies administer tenders in some
settings (Leopold et al., 2008).
This study has limitations. First, the procurement data are self-re-
ported by suppliers, without independent verification. No validation of
the completeness and quality of reporting has been conducted to date,
so the data may be incomplete. The information relating to high-
priority items (e.g., anti-retroviral and anti-tuberculosis medicines) is
likely to be more reliable given greater pressure from the government
O.J. Wouters et al. Social Science & Medicine 220 (2019) 362–370
368
on firms to comply with tendering regulations. Nevertheless, even if the
point estimates might not be exact for all products, the results indicate
large discrepancies between estimated and procured quantities in many
cases. Second, we did not examine within-contract price adjustments
for exchange rate fluctuations due to lack of data for many of the older
tenders. Third, some line items were missing in the published tender
contracts. Omissions may have reflected cases where no bids were re-
ceived or no contract could be awarded. In such instances, the national
government sometimes chose to retender for missing items and to an-
nounce the winners in subsequent addenda. We did not have access to
all addenda dating back to 2003, so these were excluded from our
analyses. Fourth, the sample sizes for some of the price indexes were
small, given the need to track a common sample of products over time.
Results for those medicine categories, notably anti-tuberculosis, family-
planning, and anti-retroviral therapies, should be interpreted with
caution. Finally, the Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes may over or un-
derstate competition in some drug classes, since the results are pre-
sented at the tender-wide level and may obscure different trends in
individual classes. Also, some local drug distributors collaborate with
many international suppliers but were counted as unique firms in the
analyses. This may have resulted in an overestimation of the degree of
market concentration in some tenders.
5. Conclusion
Tendering allows central buyers to aggregate drug demand across
many patients and increases their leverage against companies. It can be
an effective measure for securing low medicine prices on a sustainable
basis. It may allow drug purchasers to achieve economies of scale and
scope, realize administrative savings, and improve price transparency.
The price decreases observed in this study are likely due in large part to
the ability of a monopsony—in this case a single purchaser of medicines
on behalf of many patients—to negotiate aggressively with suppliers.
Yet there is room for error and unforeseen issues as the system relies
on accuracy of forecasting that is not always achievable. We found large
discrepancies between the drug quantities the South African govern-
ment estimated it would need to meet patient demand and the quan-
tities the government went on to procure during tender period. The
number of different firms winning contracts decreased over time in
most tender categories, which potentially increases the sensitivity of the
system to supply disruptions. Policymakers and other health stake-
holders should regularly examine the functioning of tendering policies
to quickly catch and address problems like price hikes and supply dis-
ruptions to preserve the integrity of tendering-based pharmaceutical
care systems.
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